Objectives: To use organizational change theory to explore the interplay of contextual influences on patient safety.
Introduction
Patient safety is recognized as a major issue for health care organizations. Inquiries focusing on catastrophic and avoidable failures in health care highlight a range of strategies to address patient safety failures. Policymakers and researchers identify two approaches: one, a 'top down' approach focused on analysis of errors 1 leading to development of performance standards and processes to attribute accountability; and, a 'bottom up' approach which favours the development of a patient safe culture. 2 This paper attempts to unravel the contextual complexity of patient safety and uses organizational change theory as a lens to analyse how content, contextual and process factors converge to influence patient safety. In so doing, it offers insight into how health care leaders may approach the task of promoting a patient-safe organizational culture as they steer around internal and external hazards.
Organizational culture and patient safety
Definitions of organizational culture are diverse and contested. 3 Some commentators view organizational culture as a variable capable of managerial manipulation, 4 while others see it as a root metaphor or nonconscious, pervasive and embedded set of behaviours that are unlikely to change basic assumptions held by organizational members. 5 We posit that different microcultures co-exist and are contested within health care organizations, 6 but that leaders may have a strong influence in stimulating a culture supportive of patient safety. 7 This takes on board Schein's definition of organizational culture that clusters the many dimensions of culture into three levels that relate to artefacts, values and basic assumptions, and acknowledges the existence of sub-cultures which may work alongside or co-exist with the broader organizational culture. 8 The patient safety literature highlights a range of cultural dimensions that appear to influence safety. These include: a shared priority for the safety of patients; 9 an open and non-punitive environment where staff feel safe to report incidents, 9 where reporting of incidents and near misses is a norm; 1 and a just culture where trust is well established and where there is a well established collective understanding of accountability for actions. 10 Broader contextual and process influences on patient safety A range of broader contextual factors appears to influence patient safety. For example, Vincent et al. 11 identify seven types of factors: patients; tasks; technology; team; environmental; organizational and institutional factors. Similarly, Nieva and Sorra 12 identify: the promotion of safety by management; the development of structures for teamwork in and across hospital units; open communication; effective transmission of communication; a no blame culture; adequate staffing levels; continuous learning; safety awareness; and hospital wide systems and processes to support safety. In addition, studies by West et al. 13 also link the sophistication of appraisal systems, training and the percentage of staff working in teams to patient mortality rates.
The receptive contexts for change model 14 suggests that organizational change receptivity may be influenced by eight contextual factors. These factors identify the importance of how: (i) quality and coherence of policy should link to a broad strategic vision that enables both commitment building and linking strategic goals to operational actions; (ii) key individuals must lead change, with an emphasis on the dispersed and collective nature of their roles, stability of leadership and the possession of personal skills; (iii) long term environmental pressure is likely to drain energy from organizational change processes and financial pressures harm morale; (iv) supportive organizational attributes are recognized; (v) effective managerial-clinical relationships involve clinicians in management; (vi) informal and purposeful networks that provide opportunities for training and commitment building draw together 'top down' and 'bottom up' concerns about safety; (vii) managers set clear and specific priorities; and (viii) the organization's change agenda should fit with its locale.
Some prior attention thus focuses on identifying systemic causes of error and cultural attributes supportive of patient safety, but we argue that limited consideration has been given so far to understanding how contextual factors work in concert to mediate and influence patient safety. This paper aims to address this gap by using the lens of organizational change receptivity to explore the interplay of complex contextual factors influencing patient safety.
Methods
The paper draws from a study 15 which aimed to explore organizational culture change and wider contextual factors affecting patient safety and staff wellbeing in eight NHS acute hospital trusts in England (referred to as trusts A-H). Three project strands explored: senior leadership; the wellbeing of front-line workers (nurses); and a multi-faceted, multi-method organizational strand. The current findings are drawn from the organizational strand. The bulk of the fieldwork was conducted 2005 -07. Trusts were purposively sampled and varied in terms of official performance criteria in relation to patient safety and staff wellbeing; size; status; and location, including geography, accessibility and population served, as well as foundation (more autonomous) or non-foundation (less autonomous) status (see Box 1) . The organizational strand involved comparative case studies of trusts. Four trusts (A -C) were studied in depth and four in less detail (E -H).
In total, 144 interviews were conducted. These included: interviews with senior managers (chief executives of all trusts or their acting officers); others on the executive board including medical and finance directors; staff directly charged with patient safety, risk, human resources and/or staff wellbeing responsibilities; middle managers; and front line staff. Interview questions focused on issues related to the content, context and process issues affecting patient safety and staff wellbeing. 16, 17 Change content issues related to staff perceptions of the scale, scope, character and magnitude of the cultural change. Consideration was given to staff interpretations of the goals, vision, and understanding of the change strategy. Contextual issues focused on identifying the influences of organizational structure, culture, history, staff wellbeing and resource constraints on patient safety performance. Process issues focused on clinical governance processes, trust leadership styles, incident reporting and analysis, and systems and processes supportive of patient safety and staff wellbeing. Interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed and anonymized.
Limited non-participant observation, both formal and informal, was undertaken. Nine meetings were observed including meetings of trust executive boards, governance, risk and legal services, health and safety, and senior management teams. The researchers recorded their experiences and interpretations of the actions, interactions, roles, motives and perspectives of participants in a diary and in contemporaneous notes. 18 Documentary analysis also served to enrich understanding of the trusts' internal and external context. trust documentary data included: annual reports, executive board minutes, policy documents, incident reports, complaints' reports, health and safety reports, and infection control reports. National data were also collected, such as health care commission annual health check information and National Health Service (NHS) national staff and patient survey information.
Trust performance was analysed using a range of data sources. Financial stability was described in trust annual reports and final accounts. Quality of care was characterised from annual health check ratings. Staff wellbeing was interpreted from measures included in the national NHS staff survey ( percentage of staff suffering illness or injury as a result of work-related stress) as well as reported staff perceptions of wellbeing.
Patient safety performance was derived from official sources, and interview and trusts' documentary data. Official sources included: measures in the national NHS staff survey ( percentage of staff reporting errors or near misses); reported standardized mortality rates; and hospital-acquired infection rates. Staff interpretations of patient safety performance were derived from their reported perceptions of patient safety performance and their acknowledgement of patient safety initiatives.
Data collection and analysis were concurrent. Three researchers collected data, and were independently involved in coding, analysis, cross-checking and comparing interpretations and emerging themes. Transcribed and documentary data sources were input into Nvivo 7, qualitative analysis software. The processual framework 16, 17 and the receptive concepts for change model 14 provided the sensitizing conceptual framework to guide analysis. One mini case study (trust G) served as a pilot analysis. Concepts and key categories were interactively derived from the conceptual framework and emerging themes generated by the data.
Results

Characterizing trust performance
Box 1 summarizes the performance and contextual features of each trust. Consistent themes related to: limited understanding of the meaning of patient safety; severe environmental shocks affecting trusts; reported cultural enablers and barriers to patient safety; reported organizational processes and structures supportive of patient safety; and staff members' perceptions of leadership roles and behaviours supportive of patient safety. Boxes 2-6 provide examples from the interview data to illustrate each theme. 
Barriers and cultural enablers of patient safety
Staff members suggested a range of barriers to patient safety: heavy workloads; staff communication failures;
failure to follow and document procedures; poor staffing levels; limited awareness of risk; and priority to achieve performance targets. Analysis indicated that more participative cultures with higher levels of staff participation in decision-making (trusts A, H, C, D and F) were linked to better patient safety outcomes (see Box 4) . Cultural enablers included: positive staff attitudes to change and innovation; staff members' willingness to question; the existence of long-standing and high trust staff relationships; and positive staff attitudes to Box 2 Limited common understanding of patient safety Language of patient safety I just don't think we've used the words 'patient safety' in a regular and repetitive way. I think it's a bit like the word 'hygiene', 'hygiene' never featured in any documentation (Nursing director) I don't believe that [ patient safety], it is not just clinical governance, it is the organizational governance that needs to go with that and I don't believe we've got that within the structure (Clinical director) Well, I think people see the issues of quality, i.e. I want to do this procedure or use this drug or this kind of intervention, but they don't, we don't, translate that into some of the mundane routines that are about safety, about checking and having the systems that are fail safe (Chief executive) Understanding of incidents Because, let's say somebody goes to theatre and they're going to have, I don't know, their appendix out or something, and during theatre, you know, something goes wrong, maybe the appendix is very stuck to the bowel . . . they nick the bowel while they're doing it so they have to sew the bowel and maybe do a de-functioning colostomy, now they [staff] wouldn't see that as an incident (Risk manager) I think that, genuinely, some people come to work, even in health cultures, where they are completely oblivious to the consequences of what they do because they only see themselves in the context of what they do and not in the context of what they do and the impact it has on others . . . they don't understand the chain of consequences (Chief executive)
Box 3 Environmental shocks
There has just been absolutely no stability. All the directors have changed. All the non-executive directors have also changed in the past couple of years (Governance manager) We are a bit in limbo because they [the PCTs] amalgamated and now we have got two PCTs, manager risk and legal services. (Risk and legal services manager) But it does mean the organization possibly facing a £x million deficit, but still hoping to go forward to foundation trust (Legal services manager) We saw a sharp increase and it got to a stage where we didn't have the facilities, like side-rooms, to isolate patients in and it was, gosh, we can't cope with this operationally (Head of nursing)
Box 4 Examples of barriers to patient safety
Poor communication I think one of the biggest things . . . is communication, poor communication is a big barrier and it is something that's so easy to put right. What other barriers? You see, everything I think of in my head, all links to communication (Matron) Junior doctors failure to report No, I have never seen a doctor fill one out, never. Never (Staff nurse) Lack of awareness But not knowing -knowing what you don't know -is the hardest thing (Chief executive) Staff training But staff members on the wards weren't trained, and it is a recognized problem and they can't train everybody in everything, but at least you should be able to call on somebody who can if you need to. It has a long-term negative effect on this patient, as well as being a relatively high-risk situation because the staff on the ward didn't know how to clear the tube. They didn't know how to use suction (Lead patient safety) Staffing I think the staff mix is wrong and I think with the changes that are happening in the NHS at the moment, reducing the length of stay, obviously means the client group changes as well and their dependency changes as a result. Not only does the skill mix need to change in order to meet that change in dependency, but it's also the technological advances, so we've got a training issue (Matron of surgery) We get a fair amount of staffing incidents reported, probably, oh, about ten a month. It's quite a lot (Clinical midwifery manager) Not following procedures So, you've got a trolley with all the notes from the patients who have been in the night before, with probably three or four sets of the eight o'clock admissions and then you've, like, got to chase everyone to find 
Trust leadership
Staff perceived that senior leadership behaviours that galvanized trust staff were important in signalling patient safety and staff wellbeing priorities. These included: 'walkarounds'; open trust-wide briefings; and use of role models in championing patient safety and staff wellbeing. Senior clinical staff also highlighted how they employed 'permission behaviours' or verbal communication that encouraged junior staff engagement in decision-making. Senior sisters or charge nurses, who were appointed as matrons, 19 played an important part as visible and clinical leaders that made sense of patient safety problems, mobilized resources, and designed and implemented solutions. In trusts A and H trust senior leadership successfully adopted a hybrid transformational/transactional style 20 which appeared to encourage participation in decision-making (see Box 6) .
Organizational structures and processes
Organizational structures and processes supportive of patient safety were emphasised in trusts A, H, C, D and F. These included: processes and structures supporting the use of multiple methods of communication and structures and feedback processes that linked clinical governance, risk reporting, risk management and complaints procedures. A range of practices were reported that supported patient safety. These included: the use of story-telling and incident reconstruction to communicate patient safety learning; trust-wide involvement in the investigation of incidents; creation of social spaces to encourage informal interaction; and the use of matrons 19 to disseminate priority for patient safety, and to, follow up and diffuse potential complaints.
Contextual influences on patient safety performance: a typology of NHS acute hospital trusts
Assessment of each trust in terms of these contextual themes led to the development of an interpretive schema and typology of case study trusts to make sense of the complex interplay of contextual influences on patient safety performance at a point in time (Table 1) . Table 1 groups trusts as 'resilient' (A and H), capable of maintaining stability of operations; 'adaptive' (C, D and F), able to rapidly develop strategies to cope with major organizational shocks; 'in recovery' (B and G), coping with crises in a piecemeal fashion; and 'conservative and passive' (E), where staff lacked the impetus to involve themselves proactively in patient safety or change.
'Resilient' trusts (trusts A and H) possessed the highest number of 'change receptive' factors 14 which Box 6 Leadership promoting patient safety They do all the right things, I think; this is the senior management team. They signpost it early on, they give the message out (Head of patient safety) The CEO invites lots of participants and engagement, invites lots of questions (Director of human resources) Culture, if it is a true culture, is so deeply engrained, behaviourally and otherwise, the best you can do is modify certain behaviour, value certain behaviours and you can ignore others and that gradually produce culture shift (Chief executive) Over the last two years on strengthening leadership for matrons and ward sisters and changes nurses, and one of the things that I recognized was that there had not been much investment directly in those professional groups, over the preceding few years (Director of nursing) Simply, by visibility, corridor conversations are always quite an important thing. I always take advantage of anybody I bump into, I always engineer a conversation, particularly with clinicians. But I also do some of the fairly traditional approaches where people say if they want to see me then they get to see me straight away (Chief executive)
Box 5 Examples of enablers of patient safety I am going to do a reconstruction of a critical patient safety incident (Legal affairs officer) We have table top reviews and we develop action plans and we spend a lot of time giving thought to those (Head of health and safety) Now more people are inclined to report and I think because it is easier to fill them in online, the forms, that people do more readily do it (Head of nursing training) We have improved on it in recent months, actually, because we now get quarterly reports of our areas on our DATIX to see what's going on. I get every DATIX sent through to me from all of my areas, so I will then communicate with my ward sisters: 'what's going on? I am here and do we need to do this?' (Acting matron) We came up with the methodology and we came up with the grading grid before the NPSA had come out with their grading grid. We used, obviously, used information probably, the Australia and New Zealand standards (Deputy director of nursing) So, it's actually that embracing people, questioning, people wanting to change and creating an environment whereby people can change things without having to go through an elaborate permission system (Matron) We have an official newsletter which has got an absolutely scurrilous back page and it is deliberately written in a sort of Private Eye style, specifically, because we know that people want to get a copy of it and they will read everything trying also linked to their relatively high performance for patient safety and staff wellbeing indicated in their performance ratings. The organizational cultures within trusts A and H were perceived as 'consultative, participative, democratic' and encouraging staff engagement. This confirms existing theory that these cultural attributes may link to higher levels of performance. 21 Leadership in both trusts was also reported as highly stable. It is suggested that this stability generated predictability of behaviours and high trust relationships which supported a patient-safe culture. Both trusts had been exposed to some environmental pressure. 14 Trust H had experienced a merger and trust A had experienced a reconfiguration of its PCTs. However, trust staff did not emphasize these environmental issues during their interviews which may indicate that the leadership had managed to buffer any negative effects. The chief executive's style of leadership was also characterized as a mixture of democratic and directive styles, and reflected elements of both transactional and transformational leadership styles, 20 which have been linked to higher levels of performance. 21 The data suggest that the receptiveness of these trusts to change was also linked to organizational capabilities which supported innovation and knowledge management. 22 Trusts A and H possessed complex, efficient and integrated support processes covering clinical governance, risk management and complaints analysis. Likewise, diffusion of knowledge and organizational learning across these trusts was facilitated by: open; multilevel communication and feedback channels; staff participation in decision-making and a simplified incident reporting system; good quality relationships; stable leadership; and strong clinical-managerial relationships.
'Adaptive trusts' demonstrated how strong environmental pressures had galvanised trust leadership to become operationally involved in patient safety and infection control strategies. As a consequence, innovative strategies were developed to analyse and investigate incidents, and transmit best practice across the trusts. This confirms the links posited between increased innovation and extreme environmental pressures 14, 22 during radical change. In trusts C, D and F, senior leadership also exhibited transformational behaviours, 20 such as involvement in team briefs and 'walkarounds'. 23 Matrons were mobilized 19 as change agents to promote patient safety. They possessed an ability to absorb feedback and intuit local problems, 24 anticipate risks, mobilize problem-solving and then translate customised solutions effectively back to staff. 25 Cultural norms in the 'adaptive trusts appeared to indicate a shared and increased priority for patient safety and an emphasis on accessing, transmitting and using organizational learning. 15 Hence, these trusts were able to learn from errors and effectively communicated this knowledge and insight via innovative practices such as 'table top' investigations (meetings convened by staff drawn from across the trust to informally discuss a specific incident).
Trusts B and G, ('in recovery') had experienced major environmental pressures and confirmed the proposition put forward by the receptive contexts model 14 that such extreme pressures can severely distract trust leadership and limit its ability to respond to problems and change. Likewise, distrust between clinicians and senior management resulted in limited staff engagement in incident reporting.
Similarly, environmental shocks arising from reconfiguration of PCT services (trust B), and severe financial and infection control problems (trust G) had resulted in poor staff morale and affected staff engagement in reporting patient safety incidents. Low perceived priority for patient safety also links to low performance outcomes for patient safety.
The leadership was also perceived as failing to implement safety policy as the trusts were overwhelmed by externally imposed change. Staff members were busy, dissatisfied and unable to access training which would have improved their competence and awareness of patient safety. Failure to access training appeared to link to limitations in staff awareness of patient safety breaches and patient safety performance. This confirms established links between performance and training.
The 'conservative and passive' trust (E) appeared to focus on the achievement of government targets. The high level of environmental stability reflected the bureaucratic structure which was perceived to be resistant to change and characterizes the 'safe culture' posited by Wiegmann et al. 26 Strong longstanding relationships also provided a buffer against stress and pressure. This trust was also viewed as slow in decision-making, overwhelmed by change and unable to clarify goals. This preference for continuity over innovation and change was also reflected in its failure to develop new practices and effectively transmit knowledge across the trust.
Discussion
The evidence presented here largely confirms the propositions of the receptive contexts for change model 14 with regard to the importance of organizational characteristics that support staff involvement in decision making (trusts A and H) and contextual factors influencing organizational ability to respond to patient safety challenges (for example, how financial environmental pressures sap organizational capability [trusts B & G]). The model emphasizes the role of senior leadership in building commitment, articulating a clear change vision and demonstrating transactional skills in translating policy into strategy (shown in trusts A and H). Trusts A, C, D, F and H also demonstrated organizational capabilities in developing and using networks to access and transmit knowledge and learning to improve patient safety.
This study has some limitations. The detailed case studies generated some interesting associations between organizational and contextual factors, and patient safety performance, but it would be hazardous to generalize the findings. The aggregated findings may belie the unique nuances identified in each trust. The study is also time-limited. Multiple patient safety initiatives are ongoing and many have been introduced since data collection. Interviews, the primary source of data, were predominantly with managers and staff responsible for incident reporting and risk analysis, and to a lesser extent with rank-and-file clinical staff. Hence, they tend to reflect a leadership and managerial orientation. However, some members of the senior executive teams were clinicians, and participants involved in risk analysis and infection control were also clinicians.
The study extends understanding of the complex interplay of contextual and process factors that influence patient safety, and the development of an organizational culture supportive of patient safety. A typology of trusts suggests how: organizational stability, the behaviour of senior leaders; and the presence of cultural attributes and organizational capabilities supportive of staff engagement appear to mediate patient safety performance. Attention is drawn to how severe environmental pressures can affect and threaten patient safety and staff wellbeing which then lead to staff being stressed, pressured and distracted, leading to further implications for patient safety. It emphasizes how organizational cultural attributes and stability of trust staff can mitigate these problems especially when supported by a collaborative culture focused on innovation and learning. Stability without these positive attributes was seen to have a negative effect on patient safety and staff wellbeing. 
